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THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN 
PRIVATE FINANCIAL FIRMS: RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF 
THE MARKET MODEL 
James A. Fanto*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OLD VERSUS THE NEW IN FINANCE 
 
Remember the former world of finance? There were easily identifiable 
financial institutions that operated primarily in their allotted spheres, with 
their designated regulators and with most of their activity in the public eye. 
Firms registered as broker-dealers specialized in either investment banking 
(corporate finance and merger advice) or retail brokerage;1 banks took in 
deposits and made mainly commercial loans;2 and insurance companies 
underwrote policies, hedged their insurance risk in the reinsurance market, 
and were major buyers of company debt in private placements.3 The upstart 
was the private equity firm, which shook up the corporate and financial 
establishment in the 1990s, as it essentially reintroduced merchant banking 
into the United States and provided a new kind of investment for 
institutions and wealthy individuals.4 Stock exchanges, with a few rare 
exceptions, were quasi-public, essentially national organizations with a 
characteristic clientele, such as large capitalization firms for the New York 
Stock Exchange.5
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor, Brooklyn Law School. 
 1. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 
AM. U.L. REV. 75, 83–84 (2004) (“The activities of many financial firms can be divided roughly 
into two categories, investment banking and retail brokerage . . . .”). 
 2. See Independent Bankers Ass’n of America v. C.T. Conover, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22529, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 1985) (“Section 2(c) of the BHCA as amended in 1970, defines 
the term ‘bank’ for purposes of that act as ‘any institution . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the 
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making 
commercial loans.’”). 
 3. See generally, Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance – Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 
NEB. L. REV. 726 (1992). 
 4. See generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL 
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998) 
[hereinafter NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS]. 
 5. See generally Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in 
the U.S. and the U.K., 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 747, 766 (2004) (“[T]he NYSE is not a publicly 
traded entity and, as the world’s largest stock exchange, serves as a ‘quasi-public institution with 
an important regulatory function.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 This is, of course, an idealized portrait; the last twenty 
years of the 20th century also saw the beginning of an intense competition 
between, and a blending of, the different kinds of financial institutions, as 
each one encroached upon the territory of the others by offering similar 
products and services. Now there exists a very different financial world, 
where it is not always easy to categorize a particular financial institution, 
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there has been a growth of private financial institutions,6
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) officially 
created the financial conglomerate, allowing diverse financial institutions to 
operate together under a single financial holding company.
 and financial 
regulators appear to be constantly trying to catch up with financial 
developments. 
7 In this 
structure, the separate identities and functions of the financial institutions 
are nominally maintained.8 Commercial banks still conduct “banking,” 
while their investment bank, futures commission merchant, and insurance 
company affiliates focus on their traditional tasks.9 However, the financial 
institutions often supply overlapping products10 and are ultimately operated 
together in the financial conglomerate as the group’s services are offered to 
clients in combination.11
                                                                                                                 
 6. See generally NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS, supra note 4; Peter J. Wallison, For 
Financial Regulation, Era of Big Government Really is Over, STATE NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 
2008, at 2–4 (“One of the most significant unremarked trends of the last twenty-five years has 
been the growth of private financial markets and private financial institutions . . . . From 1996 to 
2006, the real assets of the ten largest private-sector banks in the world grew in nominal terms 
from $4.6 trillion to $17.4 trillion, a growth rate of 277 percent.”). 
 7. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in 
scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.). 
 8. See generally F. Jean Wells & William D. Jackson, Major Financial Services Legislation: 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106-102): An Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (1999), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/glba/RL30375.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 9. See generally id. See also Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why 
the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2005) (“The [Gramm-Leach Bliley Act] repealed portions of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and other laws in order to permit banks, securities firms, 
insurance companies, and other entities engaged in the provision of financial services to become 
affiliated with one another in order to form financial conglomerates. These types of affiliations 
allow financial services entities to cross sell each other’s products and services.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Isaac Lustgarten, International Legal Developments in Review 1999: 
Business Regulation: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act and International Banking, 34 INT’L LAW 429 
(Part II) (1999). 
 10. For example, a variable annuity requires a person to make payments until retirement, at 
which time that person receives a stream of income until his or her death that is based on the 
investment performance of the payments. It is offered by insurance companies, broker-dealers and 
banks, and it is classified as a securities product. See Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995). 
 11. Unfortunately, the best example of this is that, during the corporate scandals of the early 
2000s, it was revealed that many parts of certain financial holding companies collaborated with 
the scandal-ridden firms. See generally The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse: 
Hearing Before Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 107th 
Cong., 107-618 (2002) (statement of Robert Roach, Chief Investigator); In re Enron Corp., No. 
01-16034, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (App. D, Third Interim Report of Neal Batson at 1), available 
at http://www.enron.com/media/3rd_Examiners_Report_AppendixD.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 
2008) (“Citigroup helped Enron implement-and in some cases designed-a number of SPE 
transactions.”). 
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In the private investment world, private equity has expanded to include 
venture capital, which specializes in start-up companies,12 and hedge funds, 
which make their money from trading strategies.13 Investment banks have 
also embraced this private world, offering asset management comparable to 
the private financial participants (e.g., private equity firms), as well as 
providing services to them.14 However, the competition between regulated 
and unregulated firms is not all in one direction: private firms have become 
major providers of capital to nonfinancial firms and are now the equivalent 
of investment and commercial banks.15 Stock exchanges have also gone 
international to expand their product offerings, and have themselves 
become privately owned, for-profit companies.16 Moreover, they compete 
with broker-dealers, commercial banks, and private financial firms, which 
have created their own trading platforms.17
On the regulatory front, Gramm-Leach-Bliley reaffirmed the previous 
framework of functional regulation, which means that regulators maintain 
jurisdiction over their traditional clientele (e.g., the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) over broker-dealers and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) over national banks) and the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve regulates the holding company and provides a 
safeguard of last resort for the stability of the financial system.
 
18
                                                                                                                 
 12. See generally NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS, supra note 4; see also National Venture 
Capital Assoc., The Venture Capital Industry: An Overview, http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2008). 
 However, 
as will be discussed in more detail below, much financial activity, including 
 13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS 
AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT 
CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d08200.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) [hereinafter GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT] (“[T]he term is 
commonly used to describe pooled investment vehicles that are privately organized and 
administered by professional managers and that often engage in active trading of various types of 
securities and commodity futures and options contracts.”). 
 14. The services fall under the rubric of “prime brokerage,” which generally means that a 
registered broker-dealer offers to a hedge fund transaction services for its trading and secured 
loans using the securities owned by the fund as collateral. See generally Philipp Hildebrand, 
Hedge funds and prime broker dealers: steps towards a “best practice proposal”, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 67 (2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/ 
2007/etud2_0407.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 15. See Andrew Crockett, The evolution and regulation of hedge funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY 
REV. 19, 22 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/ 
2007/etud2_0407.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 16. The best example here is the former New York Stock Exchange, which is now NYSE 
Euronext, after going private and merging with a major European exchange. See generally 
NYSE.com, About Us, http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html (last visited Aug. 26, 
2008). 
 17. See generally Scott Patterson & Aaron Lucchetti, Boom in ‘Dark Pool’ Trading Networks 
Is Causing Headaches on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2008, at C1 (describing alternative 
trading systems). 
 18. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2), (4) & (5) (2008). 
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private financial firms, remains outside the direct jurisdiction of any 
financial regulator.19
II. THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL WORLD
 
This essay addresses whether financial regulators have taken the most 
appropriate regulatory approach towards the diverse and complex private 
financial activities that occur both inside and outside regulated financial 
conglomerates. Part II identifies the various kinds of private financial 
activities and examines the general approach of financial regulation to the 
unregulated private firms conducting those activities. Part III reviews the 
migration of those activities into regulated financial firms and the primary 
strategy of regulators regarding those activities, as well as the similarities 
between this strategy and the regulators’ approach with respect to 
unregulated firms, particularly in risk management. Next, Part IV addresses 
questions raised by the current financial crisis about the effectiveness of 
these similar approaches. Then, Part V discusses major obstacles to 
improving risk management in private firms and in regulated firms 
conducting comparable activities, especially the structure of employment 
and compensation in the securities industry today. In conclusion, Part VI 
provides several observations about the possibility of reform with respect to 
private financial activities. 
20
Private financial institutions are typically organized in a uniform 
fashion. Financial specialists, often former investment bankers and traders, 
set up financial advisory firms, which may or may not be registered with 
the SEC as an investment adviser or broker-dealer.
 
21 These firms, in turn, 
organize investment funds to which institutional investors and high-net-
worth individuals subscribe.22 The funds are unregulated because they do 
not raise money through a public capital-raising23
                                                                                                                 
 19. See discussion infra Part III. 
 20. For current purposes, private financial institutions are those institutions involved in private 
equity and alternative asset management. 
 21. Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, an investment adviser need not register with 
the SEC if it does not hold itself out to the public as such, nor acts as an adviser to a registered 
investment company, and if it has fewer than 15 clients in the preceding 12 months. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-3(b)(3) (2008). “Client” refers to a fund established by the adviser, not to the beneficial 
owners of the fund. A person need not register as a “broker” or “dealer” unless it engages “in the 
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,” (15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(4)(A) (2008)), or “in the business of buying and selling securities for such person’s own 
account through a broker or otherwise.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A). A key term in this definition is 
“business.”  Since the adviser purchases and sells securities for the client fund, it is not considered 
to be a broker or dealer. 
 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
 23. In other words, funds raise money through private placements, which can be exempt from 
the requirement to register the securities offering with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2008); 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008). 
 and because the funds 
themselves qualify for one of the exceptions to the Investment Company 
2008] The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms 33 
Act of 1940.24 The funds, in turn, specialize in a particular kind of 
investment and/or investing strategy depending upon the expertise of the 
investment manager.  In general, private equity funds focus on long-term 
investments in existing firms that are often taken private to be 
rehabilitated.25 In contrast, venture capital funds invest in start-up firms,26 
while hedge funds focus on trading strategies with extensive use of 
derivatives to hedge risk or to speculate.27 Thus, depending upon the kind 
of fund, investors will be more or less restricted in receiving the return on 
their investment. Many funds also use extensive leverage in their 
investments in order to boost their returns, as do investors in the funds.28
Some private financial firms prefer to remain unregulated and thus elect 
not to become registered broker-dealers or investment advisers.
 
29 Apart 
from abortive efforts to regulate these private financial participants, the 
approach of U.S. financial regulators to them has been twofold.30 First, 
financial regulators indirectly regulate: they gather information about, and 
exercise some influence over, the activities of private financial firms 
through their power over regulated firms, such as banks and broker-
dealers.31 These latter, regulated firms provide products and services to the 
private firms, such as trading services and margin in the case of broker-
dealers32
                                                                                                                 
 24. Investment companies are exempt from registration if their shares are not offered publicly 
and if either their shares are not beneficially owned by more than 100 investors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(1), or their purchasers are “qualified” (i.e., individuals owning at least $5 million in 
investments, or firms owning at least $25 million in investments). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
 and loans and investment products, such as participation in 
 25. See Investopedia.com, Private Equity, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ 
privateequity.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 26. See National Venture Capital Association, supra note 12. 
 27. See Investopedia.com, Hedge Fund, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 28. See Thomas Schneeweis, Hossein Kazemi &Vassilis Karavas, Leverage Impacts on Hedge 
Fund Risk and Return Performance, ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., U. MASS. at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.lyracapital.com/documents/Leverage-final.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). They do 
this in accordance with a basic principle of financial economics that, if one borrows money at a 
fixed rate of return in order to invest it, together with one’s own money, at a greater rate, the 
return on the investor’s contribution will be greatly magnified. See also Investopedia.com, 
Leverage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 29. See GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 12–13 (discussing registration of hedge 
fund advisers). 
 30. The most notorious example was the SEC’s rule amendment to Rule 203(b)(3)-1, which 
changed the definition of client for adviser registration purposes from the “fund” to the “beneficial 
owners” of the fund (i.e., limited partners or members in limited liability companies), except for 
funds with the lengthy lock-ups typical of private equity or venture capital funds. This rule was 
struck down as outside the SEC’s power by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 31. This is the general practice in sophisticated economies throughout the world with respect 
to hedge funds. See generally Daniele Nouy, Indirect supervision of hedge funds, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 95 (2007). 
 32. On this indirect regulation through broker-dealers, see GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra 
note 13, at 19. 
34 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
syndicated loans and structured vehicles, in the case of commercial banks.33 
The private participants are also counterparties with regulated financial 
firms in the trading of many, often exotic, financial instruments, particularly 
complex derivatives, such as credit derivatives.34 Financial regulators can 
thus gather information about the activities and risk exposure of private 
firms and their sponsors from the regulated firms, especially since the risk 
models and capital positions of the regulated firms have to take account of 
and reflect their dealings with these firms.35 Indeed, financial regulators can 
influence the conduct of the unregulated firms simply by insisting that 
particular transactions with them occur in a specified way or that the 
provision of leverage to them be restricted (e.g., by requiring more capital 
in a regulated firm in order to engage in a particular transaction with a 
private firm).36
Second, financial regulators encourage the alternative asset 
management industry to adopt “best practices” for its members and thus to 
regulate itself.
 
37 For example, the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets, which is composed of the main U.S. financial regulators,38 
recently received reports of proposed best practices for hedge funds39 and 
for hedge fund investors.40 Financial regulators are being particularly astute 
here, for they must know that self-regulation is often a predecessor to 
official regulation, which occurs after the private parties have created a 
regulatory model that they cannot enforce among themselves, and when 
regulators step in and transform the model into a public good.41
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 24–25. 
 In a related 
 34. See id. (noting that hedge funds account for more than 80% of the credit derivatives 
market). These would be instruments in which, among other things, an investor essentially 
purchases protection for the risk of holding debt of a particular company. See Investopedia.com, 
Credit Derivative, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditderivative.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 
2008). 
 35. See Nouy, supra note 31. See also GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 36. See Nouy, supra note 31. See also GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 37. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING 
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY (2008), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp927.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) 
[hereinafter ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 38. The Group is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the Chairs of the 
Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See United States 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Market Policy, Mission, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-markets/fin-market-policy/ (last visited 
Nov. 9 2008). 
 39. These reports were provided by hedge fund managers themselves. See ASSET MANAGERS’ 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37. 
 40. These reports were provided by institutional investors. See id. 
 41. That is, a particular sector of the financial industry initially agrees with financial regulators 
to adopt best practices under the view that adequate self-regulation may make regulation 
unnecessary. However, once the best practices become standard, it is in the interest of sector 
members to have the government enforce them, so that a participant cannot “free ride” on the 
enhanced reputation of the sector without actually complying with the standards. For efforts in the 
United Kingdom to promote self-regulation of hedge funds, see HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP, 
2008] The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms 35 
vein, financial regulators also encourage participants to develop standards 
with respect to activities and transactions that unregulated financial firms 
engage in, often with regulated firms as their counterparties.42 By doing so, 
financial regulators avoid devoting scarce resources to gaining expertise in 
an area in which they have no experience.43
Financial regulators are not necessarily focused on preventing the 
failure of a private financial firm. While financial regulators should be 
indifferent, they may actually hope that such a failure would lead the 
remaining private participants to agree to regulation and/or to enter into 
regulated financial groups, which would lead to a consolidation and 
maturation of the private financial industry. The real concern for financial 
regulators, which justifies their monitoring, is that the failure of an 
unregulated financial firm might adversely affect a regulated financial 
institution, which could, in turn, lead to a cascade of additional failures of 
financial institutions, a freezing up of the financial system, and, in the worst 
scenario, a drastic decrease in overall economic activity.
 
44 This 
amplification of financial institution failure is known as systemic risk.45 
Financial regulators faced this kind of situation in 1998 when they had to 
deal with the failure of the celebrated hedge fund, Long-Term Capital 
Management, which triggered more regulatory attention to the systemic 
risks posed by hedge funds.46
The failure of a private financial firm, if it is large enough, could also 
give rise to widespread media and political attention.
 
47 Increasingly, 
ordinary individuals are exposed to private financial firms through their 
investments in pension funds and in other institutional investors, which in 
turn invest in these private firms’ alternative investment vehicles.48
                                                                                                                 
HEDGE FUND STANDARDS: FINAL REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10109/files/final_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 42. See, e.g., id. 
 43. For an example of this kind of self-regulation, see Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n., Inc., 
http://www.isda.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). In particular, this Association adopted guidelines 
on structured products in response to the recent subprime financial crisis. See, e.g., STRUCTURED 
PRODUCTS: PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING THE DISTRIBUTOR-INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR 
RELATIONSHIP, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N., INC. (Exposure Draft May 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.sifma.org/private_client/pdf/GlobalRSP-Distributor-PrinciplesMay 
ExposureDraft.pdf (last visited Nov. 10 2008). 
 44. Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 
45, 50 (2007). 
 Indirect 
financial harm to ordinary individuals from the failure of a private firm 
 45. See id. at 49. 
 46. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000). 
 47. See generally Raghuram G. Rajan, Financial conditions, alternative asset management 
and political risks: trying to make sense of our times, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 137, 141–142 
(2007). 
 48. See Riva D. Atlas & Mary Willliams Walsh, Pension Officers Putting Billions Into Hedge 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/27/ 
business/yourmoney/27hedge.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
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could lead to media demands for regulation and attention from politicians 
begrudgingly responding to the crisis.49 If the failure were significant 
enough, financial regulators would also be blamed for not having been 
more aggressive in regulating, or advocating the regulation of, the private 
firms.50
The current financial crisis that was sparked by the failure of the 
subprime mortgage market is a good example of this kind of acute media 
and political attention on financial regulation.
 
51 It has brought to the 
forefront the following valid concerns about an approach that relies on 
indirect regulation of private financial firms coupled with their self-
regulation.52 First, some regulated firm personnel have strong incentives not 
to monitor closely private firms. For example, traders within investment 
banks who are directly involved in the provision of transaction services to 
private firms are reluctant to limit such business even when required by 
their firm’s risk management. Even investment bank and commercial bank 
management may resist the limits, for they are competing with other banks 
for the business of private firms. This problem is exacerbated because the 
personnel and management of investment and commercial banks may not 
rationally compare the gains from short-term trading and other gains from 
ignoring the position limits with the discounted present value of the long-
term dangers arising from ignoring these limits. As will be discussed more 
below, current employment and compensation practices in regulated firms 
undermine a proper recognition of the discounted long-term dangers.53 This 
fact applies to bank executives as well, since in the financial conglomerates 
that deal with private firms and that are publicly traded firms, executives 
have the typical enormous compensation contracts that make them 
impervious to any financial disaster.54
Second, the current model of indirect regulation may be extremely 
difficult to carry out for regulated institutions, which are actually few in 
number and all critical to the financial system.
 
55
                                                                                                                 
 49. See e.g., Jackie Calmes, Obama and McCain have different approaches to Wall Street, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/ 
09/16/america/16record.php (last visited Nov. 10 2008) (noting that both Obama and McCain 
have responded to the recent turmoil in the financial industry with calls for increased regulation). 
 50. Crockett, supra note 15, at 25. 
 51. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 52. On some of the following points, see generally Nouriel Roubini, Hedge Funds: Do We 
Need To Regulate Them and How? (June 2007) (on file with author). 
 53. See discussion infra Part V. 
 54. See, e.g., Supplemental Information on CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis, Memorandum 
from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform to Members of the Comm. 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (describing enormous compensation 
contracts of CEOs (departing) of financial institutions that performed poorly during the mortgage 
crisis). 
 55. In the United States, only the financial conglomerates, like Citigroup and JP Morgan, have 
the capacity to provide services to the private financial institutions. See Hildebrand, supra note 14, 
at 72. 
 Obtaining adequate 
2008] The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms 37 
information from the private firms with whom they do business is difficult 
because private firms are in competition with the regulated firms, giving 
them a competitive incentive not to share all their information, and 
increasing the likelihood that they will spread their business among 
different financial firms.56 For example, a regulated financial institution 
may find it difficult to get a complete understanding of the amount of 
leverage in a particular hedge fund, since investors may borrow funds to 
make an investment in a fund of funds, the fund of funds may use leverage 
for its investments in the hedge fund, and the fund itself may borrow from 
numerous financial intermediaries.57
The appropriateness of the current approach to private financial firms 
may come down to the adequacy of the risk management models used by 
regulated firms in their dealings with unregulated counterparties, as well as 
of the models used by unregulated firms to manage their own risks. To be 
adequate in the former case, the model would have to take account of the 
risk that the investment or commercial bank would not have all the 
necessary information about its unregulated counterparty (or that the 
counterparty might act opportunistically in withholding certain of this 
information), specify how the financial institution responds to this risk (e.g., 
imposing higher margins, taking bigger “haircuts” on the collateral of the 
private firm, limiting exposure to the private firm), and rigorously enforce 
this response among its personnel. The model would have to assume that 
the unregulated firm’s undisclosed direct and indirect leverage could be 
greater than what is disclosed and then consider the consequences for the 
regulated firm if a liquidity crisis arose for the private firm and for the 
market more generally. A private financial firm needs similar models 
addressing the same risks in the unregulated counterparties that it transacts 
with. As discussed later in this essay, the question is whether current risk 
models are up to these tasks and whether they can be adequately applied.
 
58
III. PRIVATE FINANCIAL FIRMS WITHIN THE REGULATED 
WORLD 
 
Private financial firms and their activities have also migrated into 
regulated financial conglomerates due to Gramm-Leach-Bliley. As 
discussed above, it officially approved the formation of financial holding 
companies that engage, or that own companies that are engaged, in all kinds 
of financial activities.59
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Crockett, supra note 15, at 26.  
 57. See Roubini, supra note 52, at 9. 
 58. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 59. See discussion infra Part II. 
 The statutory list it provided of permissible 
financial activities is broad and covers all functions of a full-service 
investment bank, including investment advisory services and merchant 
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banking.60 Significantly, the statute also empowered the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury Department to add activities to the list and set forth open-
ended criteria for them to use, such as changes in the competitive market for 
financial services, technological developments for delivering financial 
services, and the ability of the holding companies to compete in the 
financial services marketplace.61
Therefore, a financial conglomerate can create, “in house,” the 
equivalent of a private financial firm or, for the right price, acquire a private 
firm, such as a private equity firm or a hedge fund adviser. Financial 
conglomerates have done both to gain market share in these financial 
activities. To take one notable example, the current CEO of Citigroup, 
Vikram Pandit, came to Citigroup when it acquired his hedge fund firm.
 Thus, as private financial firms offer new 
kinds of financial products and services, as well as technological 
innovations in their delivery, Gramm-Leach-Bliley permits financial 
holding companies to acquire the private firms or engage themselves in 
similar activities. 
62 
Now, financial conglomerates, through their asset management divisions, 
offer their own private equity and hedge funds to their wealthy clientele, 
which are chiefly institutions and high net worth individuals.63 They often 
compete with the private financial firms to whom they provide prime 
brokerage services.64 The financial conglomerates also engage, for their 
own account, in proprietary trading and investing, particularly similar to 
hedge fund activity.65
The regulation of private financial activities conducted within financial 
conglomerates should pose less difficulty for financial regulators, who have 
collective jurisdiction over the conglomerates.
 Private financial firms have thus been partly 
“domesticated” by becoming a part of regulated financial conglomerates. 
66
                                                                                                                 
 60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2008). 
 Yet it is important to 
emphasize the nature of this regulation. Particularly since Gramm-Leach-
Bliley, financial regulators focus not so much on whether and how a 
 61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)–(3). 
 62. Pandit was a founding member and chairman of Old Lane, L.P., a hedge fund and private 
equity manager. Before that, he was the President and Chief Operating Officer of Morgan 
Stanley’s investment banking business, which emphasizes the movement of personnel back and 
forth between regulated and unregulated financial firms. Citigroup.com, Biography of Vikram 
Pandit, http://www.citi.com/citigroup/profiles/pandit/bio.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2008). 
 63. See generally Goldman LBO Fund to Raise about $20B, AFX INTERN’L FOCUS, Mar. 27, 
2007. 
 64. See generally Bank of the Year for M&A: Goldman Sachs, THE BANKER, Oct. 1, 2001, 
available at http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/4325/Bank_of_the_year_for_ 
M_A:_Goldman_Sachs.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (“Many critics believed that Goldman’s 
active private equity investment and management of private equity money for third party investors 
would generate conflict of interest between the bank and its clients.”). 
 65. See Emma Trincal, Hedge Funds Acquisitions: Good for Returns?, HEDGEWORLD DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.hedgeworld.com/preview_news.cgi?section=peop& 
story=peop2873.html&area=premium&source=wealth_management (subscription required). 
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2008). 
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financial conglomerate can engage in particular financial activities, but 
upon the competency of the group’s management and adequacy of the 
group’s capital to support them.67 In other words, the role of financial 
regulators is no longer primarily to determine the appropriateness of a 
particular financial activity for a group. There are several reasons for this 
regulatory position, aside from Gramm-Leach-Bliley. First, financial 
regulators do not have the resources to regulate substantively and quickly 
evolving financial activities; they must leave this kind of regulation to the 
market participants.68 Second, the position is based upon a particular 
normative view of the most economical way to regulate financial 
institutions: if the financial institutions themselves (and the managers of 
these institutions) have their own money at risk in the activities and not just 
investors’ money, they have self-interested reasons for taking the necessary 
safeguards with respect to the activities.69
Determining adequate capital for financial institutions is no longer just 
an issue of setting a certain baseline percentage of capital relative to the 
assets, the traditional leverage ratio in financial institutions.
 
70 Rather, for 
some time, determining adequacy of capital has required a “risk-based” 
approach: capital should be proportional to the risk of the assets themselves, 
because the riskier the assets, the more capital is required.71 Moreover, even 
off-balance sheet activities must be taken into consideration in the capital 
determination, both for their own inherent risks and the chance that they 
will move onto the institution’s balance sheet.72 Once an institution’s 
overall risk exposure is calculated, the institution sets aside a statutorily 
imposed amount of capital for these total “risk-weighted” assets and 
activities.73
As financial assets and activities have become more complex, risk 
assessment of them and the resulting capital determination have evolved as 
well. Under the current regulatory scheme for large financial institutions 
that are engaged in private financial activities, the institutions themselves 
 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2008). 
 68. This perspective is apparent in the structure of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The basic conditions 
for a firm to become a financial holding company are that its banks are “well capitalized” and 
“well managed.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1). 
 69. See infra for more discussion on the normative perspective in finance today. 
 70. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(b) (2008) (leverage ratio for national banks); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, 
App. D (2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-
2200.html#6000appendixd (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (leverage ratio for holding companies). 
 71. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) (2008) (risk-based capital ratio). 
 72. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, App. A, Sec. III (2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/la-ws/rules/6000-1900.html#6000appendixa (last visited Nov. 10, 
2008). 
 73. This is the well-known risk-based capital model promulgated by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and adopted by participatory countries. This model is known generally as 
Basel I. For the Federal Reserve’s version, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, Apps. A, E & G. 
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develop the models to assess asset risks, including counterparty risks.74
Therefore, bringing private financial activities within the sphere of 
financial regulation does not necessarily mean that there is strong 
governmental oversight of the activities or that the government establishes 
standards for them. Certainly, regulators will become more familiar with 
activities conducted within a regulated institution, or a part thereof, and can 
insist upon certain practices with respect to them. But, except in a crisis, 
financial authorities defer to the regulated institutions as to the conduct of 
the activities and, significantly, to the risk assessment of the activities, and 
thus to the adequacy of the financial institutions’ capital. In a financial 
crisis, such as the current one, regulators may be more active in discussing 
these valuation and risk assessment issues in detail, and even requiring that 
institutions enhance their capital position.
 In 
other words, financial regulators increasingly leave it to the institutions 
themselves to establish the models for determining the risk of assets and 
thus the necessary amount of capital. Once again, the regulators recognize 
that they do not have the resources to design risk models for use by the 
institutions. 
75 However, if an institution’s 
own practices and models are seriously inadequate, it is likely that this will 
become apparent too late to prevent significant damage to, and even failure 
of, the regulated firm.76
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE MARKET MODEL 
 
Current circumstances have presented a test for such a regulatory 
approach that relies greatly on risk management models. The collapse of the 
credit markets was triggered by losses in asset-backed securities, including 
those backed by subprime mortgages.77
                                                                                                                 
 74. This remark greatly simplifies things. Under the revised Basel capital framework, known 
as Basel II, a financial institution must take account of its credit risk, market risk, and operational 
risk in determining its appropriate capital. While guidance has been given as to market risk (12 
C.F.R. pt. 225, App. E), the Federal Reserve and the other banking regulators have just adopted 
guidelines as to credit and operational risks. See Risk-Based Capital Standards, Advanced Capital 
Adequacy Framework—Basel II. 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007). All these frameworks rely 
heavily on an institution’s own assessment of its risks. 
 During a sustained period of very 
 75. This essay was completed before the financial crisis became acute following the summer. 
Obviously, in a significant crisis like the present one, regulators will do everything possible to 
help financial institutions improve their capital position so that they, and our economic system, 
can survive. See, e.g., Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description, U.S. 
Treasury HP-1207 at 30, (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
hp1207.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 76. See infra Part IV. Clearly, the demise of Bear Stearns was partly due to its own private 
financial activities (e.g., hedge fund activity). 
 77. Subprime mortgages were initially and chiefly, but not exclusively, the cause of the 
collapse. See generally Dr. Faten Sabry & Dr. Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A 
Primer, Part I of a NERA Insight Series (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.nera.com/image/ 
SEC_SubprimeSeries_Part1_June2007_FINAL.pdf. However, economists who compare the 
current crisis to other post-World War II financial crises believe that it has all the characteristics 
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low interest rates, credit was extended widely to real estate buyers (even to 
those with low incomes and little savings) and the debt was packaged and 
resold as differing kinds of securities to investors looking for higher returns 
on debt investments.78 Unfortunately, it was done without a complete 
appreciation for the risk of nonpayment by the buyers and with a resulting 
mispricing of the asset-backed securities.79 The default rates and 
plummeting real estate values caused a broad reevaluation and repricing of 
the securities backed by those mortgages.80 As a result, investors became 
suspicious that other asset-backed securities were not appropriately priced 
and the onslaught of selling led to falling prices for those securities.81 This 
resulted in a general loss of liquidity for many of these and other financial 
assets and a freezing-up of the market for issuance of similar securities.82 
For example, the market for existing leveraged-buyout (LBO) securities, 
which are debt that fund company acquisitions by LBO firms, all but 
disappeared, and banks, unwilling to make any new LBO loans, attempted 
to extricate themselves from their prior commitments to fund buyouts.83 
With falling prices in financial assets, financial institutions became 
concerned about their own weakened capital position and about the 
solvency of their counterparties.84
                                                                                                                 
of a serious, but typical, financial crisis: a run-up in asset and equity prices due to capital inflows, 
slowing economic growth, an increase in public debt, and a large current account deficit. See 
Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So 
Different? An International Historical Comparison (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13,761, 2008). 
 78. See generally Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 77. 
 79. Many of the buyers made little or no down payments and were unable to afford the 
mortgage payments. They depended on the homes increasing in value in order to make the home 
purchase a worthwhile one. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE AND 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: HOUSING AND HOUSING-RELATED FINANCE (2008). 
 80. In effect, the situation was complicated. There were securities backed by subprime 
mortgages, often with the structured vehicle that held the mortgages issuing different classes or 
“tranches” of securities. In addition, there were other vehicles that held these asset-back securities 
and/or derivatives (e.g., credit default swaps based on these securities) and that issued their own 
tranches of securities (known as collateralized debt obligations). See generally Sabry & 
Schopflocher, supra note 77. 
 81. See generally Richard J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Musical chairs: a comment 
on the credit crisis, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 9, 10 (2008). 
 82. See generally id. 
 83. The most well-known dispute involved the acquisition of Clear Channel by private equity 
groups Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee where the banks who had made the commitment to fund 
the acquisition refused to honor their commitment. See Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 541 F. Supp.2d 874 (W.D. Tex. 2008). The dispute was settled, with 
the banks receiving a more favorable interest rate. See Peter Lattman & Sarah McBride, Clear 
Channel Suitors, Banks Reach Deal, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, at C3. 
 84. Problems came to financial institutions because they had to “mark to market” their own 
securities positions, as well as clients’ securities collateral. However, when many kinds of 
securities, which were traded privately among institutions, essentially stopped trading, it became 
difficult for the institutions to give an accurate assessment of their own financial position. See 
generally TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 16–19 (2008). 
 They were reluctant to engage in 
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transactions with, and particularly to extend credit to, other firms because 
they were unsure about the exposure of these firms to the troubled 
securities.85 Indeed, these circumstances satisfied many of the conditions 
for the classic definition of a financial “shock” with systemic consequences, 
as opposed to a financial disturbance.86
Problems from the credit crisis first surfaced in financial 
conglomerates
 
87 due to their own involvement in private financial activities, 
including in-house hedge funds, proprietary investments in asset-backed 
securities, and closely related special purpose entities organized to invest in 
assets.88 As a result, those institutions took enormous write-downs in their 
positions in asset-backed and other securities and had to raise capital in 
order to maintain adequate capital ratios and to safeguard their very 
solvency.89 Bear Stearns did not survive the crisis on account of its 
activities and investments in subprime assets and merged with J.P. Morgan, 
another financial conglomerate.90
                                                                                                                 
 85. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 14, 2008, at A1 (listing the institutions: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Bank 
of America, Merrill Lynch (soon to be acquired by the preceding), Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank 
of New York, State Street, with an estimated investment of a total of $130 billion by the 
Treasury). 
 86. A shock, as opposed to a disturbance, would have (i) enhanced credit risk, particularly 
counterparty credit risk, (ii) loss of market liquidity, (iii) rapid changes and losses of value of 
financial instruments, particularly complex financial instruments, (iv) doubt about the accuracy of 
financial models, (v) inability of models to deal with “tail” risks, (vi) problems in settlement, and 
(vii) illiquidity of many complex instruments. These circumstances all seem present today. 
However, other “shock” characteristics have not occurred, or not completely occurred: (viii) costs 
of appropriate risk management, (ix) difficulty of restructuring when creditors cannot be located 
easily, and (x) questions about the ability of regulators to work together. See COUNTERPARTY 
RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR 
PERSPECTIVE 7–10 (2005). For a detailed discussion of the crisis and the risks facing the global 
financial system, see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APR. 2007–31 
MAR. 2008, at 137–49 (2008). 
 87. These include the former largest, full service investment banks, which were Bear Stearns, 
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, and financial holding 
companies. See Rachelle Younglai, SEC Finds Voice with Investment Bank Plan, BASELINE.COM, 
July 28, 2008. As is now well known, as a result of the crisis, none of these investment banks any 
longer exists as they formerly did. Two (Bear Stearns and Merrill) were sold to financial holding 
companies; one (Lehman) went bankrupt; and two (Goldman and Morgan Stanley) themselves 
became financial holding companies. 
 88. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman & Jenny Strasburg, Banks Fumble at Operating Hedge 
Funds, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2008, at B1 (describing problems of financial conglomerates’ 
involvement in hedge funds); David Enrich, Citigroup Hedge-Fund Loss Weighs on Three Banks, 
WALL ST. J., May 20, 2008, at C1. 
 89. See, e.g., David Enrich, et al., Citigroup, Merrill Seek More Foreign Capital, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 11, 2008, at A1. 
 
 90. The Wall Street Journal published an interesting series of articles on Bear Stearns’ demise. 
See Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2008, at A1; Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 
28, 2008, at A1; Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL 
ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1. See also SEC v. Cioffi: SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns 
Hedge Fund Portfolio Managers with Securities Fraud, Exchange Act Release No. 20,625 (June 
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This outcome suggests that, among other things, the risk management 
models of financial conglomerates did not accurately assess the risks of the 
securities and suffered from a fundamental failure: underestimation of the 
risks that an unlikely, but disastrous, event might occur and that a liquidity 
crisis would be widespread and affect all assets equally.91 Moreover, the 
risk models of the financial institutions were not the only faulty ones, for 
the risk assessment of the securities by the “valuation” professionals, the 
rating agencies, was similarly flawed.92 As in the corporate financial 
scandals that occurred earlier in this century, the rating agencies failed to do 
their job of properly assessing the risk of securities, although this time it 
involved evaluating the risks of the subprime asset-backed securities.93
So far, it is not entirely clear how the crisis has affected private 
financial firms. The crisis could be viewed as demonstrating another 
example of an over-emphasis on financial regulation, since the most 
publicized adversely affected institutions are regulated financial groups. Yet 
it is difficult to know exactly the condition of unregulated financial 
institutions, such as hedge fund advisers and the private equity firms that 
have not gone public. Nevertheless, private equity firms have clearly 
experienced problems with some of their funds, and there have been hedge 
fund failures.
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19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20625.htm  (explaining 
civil action against managers of Bear Sterns’ own hedge funds that collapsed on account of their 
subprime investments). Again, neither Lehman nor Merrill survived as stand-alone firms. See 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Suzanne Craig, Serena Ng & Aaron Lucchetti, Lehman Files for 
Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB122145492097035549.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2008). 
 A lack of publicity and the structure of private financial 
firms make it difficult to know exactly what problems they are 
experiencing, if any. A hedge fund adviser can restrict withdrawals from 
funds, or, if a fund’s investments are particularly troubled, the adviser can 
 91. These are referred to as a “fat tail” problem (i.e., that the risk of unlikely events is greater 
than it seems) and the co-variance problem (that assets begin to move together in price). See Barry 
Eichengreen, Ten questions about the subprime crisis, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 19, 21 (2008). 
 92. See STAFF OF THE SEC’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, 
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF 
SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008) (for the problems in credit agencies with respect to 
securities backed by subprime loans). The SEC in fact has proposed rule changes as to how credit 
agencies rate structured products. See also Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, 36,235 (June 25, 
2008). 
 93. See, e.g., Peter R. Fisher, What happened to risk dispersion?, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 29, 
35 (2008). 
 94. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Hedge Funds Squeezed As Lenders Get 
Tougher, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at A1 (describing problems in Carlyle Group fund); Cassell 
Bryan-Low, Carrick Mollenkamp & Gregory Zuckerman, Peloton Flew High, Fell Fast, WALL 
ST. J., May 12, 2008, at C1 (describing the rapid demise of hedge fund Peloton Partners LLP). 
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distribute the funds’ investments, rather than cash, to the investors.95 By 
remaining private, they are somewhat more protected from the kind of 
market rumors that can lead to a “run on the bank” similar to the case of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.96 If funds are highly leveraged, as 
seems to be the case, there should be more fund failures as funds are forced 
to sell assets to meet margin calls.97 But this action occurs if a prime broker 
determines that the fund’s collateral is inadequate and if the regulated firm 
were to do this, it might have to mark down its own positions in similar 
collateral.98
Serious problems may still emerge for private market participants, 
which will in turn lead to even more difficulties for regulated financial 
institutions. After all, many private market firms, as well as regulated firms, 
engaged in risky investment strategies at a time of great liquidity, market 
stability, and low interest rates, and this disguised the fact that their returns 
resulted from favorable circumstances, not from their investment acumen.
 
99 
In the parlance of the trade, few of them have outperformed the market by 
producing “alpha.”100
We can only hope now that the current circumstances do not end up 
being a complete financial collapse, as opposed to the serious financial 
 Although the regulated participants, through their 
investment in or imitation of private firms, have suffered significant losses, 
there is no reason to think that private market participants are in a much 
better position. They all use similar risk models and also rely upon the 
rating agencies for evaluations of their investments. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Locked In: When Hedge Funds Bar the Door, WALL ST. J., July 
2, 2008, at A1 (describing how hedge funds can put up “gates” to restrict investors’ withdrawals 
from a fund). 
 96. Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan and Fed. Move to Bail Out Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/business/14cnd-bear.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2008). 
 97. Pulliam, supra note 95, at A1; see also Mortgage-bond Fund Sells Assets After Margin 
Calls, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2008-
03-07-carlyle-fund-selloff_N.htm. 
 98. Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis has been to flood the market with 
liquidity, which helps all financial participants, including hedge funds, remain afloat. See ADRIAN 
BLUNDELL-WIGNALL, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: SIZE, 
DELEVERAGING AND SOME POLICY OPTIONS 19–20 (2008) (discussing, among other things, 
threats posed by failure of hedge funds to prime broker-dealers and the manner in which the 
injection of liquidity helps prevents this failure). For an excellent discussion of the Federal 
Reserve’s conventional and unconventional efforts to address the crisis, see generally Stephen G. 
Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14,134, 2008) (noting in particular how the 
Federal Reserve has increased the kind of collateral (including asset-backed securities) that it will 
take for its loans and other operations). 
 99. See, e.g., Rajan, supra note 47, at 141–42. 
 100. In finance, “beta” refers to the market return that is correlated with market risks. An 
investment manager should not be rewarded for obtaining a beta return, but only for adding to it, 
which is alpha. See id. at 139–41 (speculating on the real reasons for the above average 
performance of many hedge funds). 
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shock that we are experiencing. A serious shock leads to an enormous 
political reaction to finance, as retail investors demand reform of the 
financial system.101 Even if the financial system is stabilized,102 the 
dominant perspective regarding financial regulation—that there is too much 
regulation and not enough deference given to market solutions—is likely to 
ring hollow.103
V. THE RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTION 
 The problems with regulated financial conglomerates and 
private financial firms have less to do with regulatory, as opposed to a 
market, failure. As explained above, they arise from the failure of risk 
models that have been developed by market participants, not imposed by 
regulators. In other words, the current crisis raises questions about the 
deference to such market participants. 
One pragmatic solution to the problems raised in the current financial 
crisis is to enhance the risk models and the role of risk management in 
private financial firms and in regulated firms, with respect to the latter’s 
comparable activities and their dealings with private firms. This response 
would be similar to the reaction of financial regulators when it was revealed 
that financial firms had participated in the corporate scandals of Enron, 
Worldcom and others, either by setting up special purpose entities used by 
companies to engage in fraud or, without inquiring into their true financial 
position, by helping the companies raise capital. In those instances, 
regulators encouraged financial institutions to set up a firm-wide transaction 
and relationship committee that would evaluate risks, including legal and 
reputation risks, arising from transactions and relationships with clients, and 
to improve legal compliance by enhancing the role of a chief compliance 
officer.104
Indeed, there have been reports that large financial institutions have 
enhanced their risk management. For example, Citigroup now has multiple 
risk managers whom the CEO regularly consults.
 On the basis of the new crisis, financial regulators should tell 
regulated financial firms that they must improve their risk models, institute 
a firm-wide senior-level risk management committee, and appoint a chief 
risk management officer or officers, who will have a special role in a firm’s 
risk management. 
105
                                                                                                                 
 101. See id. at 142. 
 102. See Jia Lynn Yang, How bad is the mortgage crisis going to get?, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/economy/krugman_subprime.fortune/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2008). 
 103. This perspective is already making its way into the financial press. See also Jon Hilsenrath, 
Markets Police Themselves Poorly, but Regulation Has Its Flaws, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at 
A2 (describing increasing disenchantment with market regulation of finance). 
 104. See generally James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial 
Holding Company by a Corporate Client’s Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 7 (2004). 
 105. See David Enrich, Citigroup Installs New Risk Managers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2008, at 
C3. 
 More significantly, 
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financial regulators are pushing for an improvement in risk management in 
regulated institutions. As a result of the crisis, the Federal Reserve, the 
SEC, and several major foreign financial regulators conducted a review of 
risk management practices through the end of 2007 at major international 
financial institutions under their jurisdiction.106 The review revealed that, 
despite past regulatory guidance on this subject, many major financial 
institutions failed to provide an adequate governance structure for dealing 
with risk.107 In particular, the report found that, in the institutions, there was 
rarely a high-level committee taking a firm-wide perspective on the current 
risks facing the institution.108 Without this kind of committee, management 
of the firms could not see the magnitude of risks, share information about 
them among its business lines,109 and take coordinated action to address 
them.110 Moreover, the report found that risk models used in firms were 
often flawed because they were based on inappropriate assumptions (e.g., 
ratings used for structured finance products were the same as those used for 
standard corporate securities) and incomplete data (e.g., historical data was 
only for periods of low volatility), and that stress testing of the models did 
not anticipate possible scenarios (e.g., co-movement of assets prices at a 
time of near total loss of liquidity).111 They also found that risk 
management at troubled firms was not imaginative and dynamic enough to 
address fast changing situations, and that it was often pushed into the 
background and even ridiculed by traders and bankers, who wanted to 
complete transactions.112
Clearly, the same pressure for enhanced risk management is being 
placed upon the private financial firms. As has already been mentioned, the 
President’s Working Group received two reports on best practices for hedge 
funds and for investors in these funds.
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 106. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
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 107. See id. 
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management oversight by bank regulators). 
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 Both of the reports recommended 
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strengthening risk management with respect to operations of and 
investments in these funds.114 The report from hedge fund advisers insisted 
that an adviser have in place procedures and policies (including having a 
chief risk officer and other specialized personnel) for accurately measuring 
the various risks of a fund (liquidity, leverage, market, counterparty credit, 
and operational) so that it can accurately disclose the fund’s risk profile and 
adequately deal with them.115 Money managers are urged to improve their 
risk management with respect to the risks of investing in hedge funds, the 
evaluation of a hedge fund’s own risk management, and understanding of a 
fund’s liquidity, leverage, operations and business risks, and compliance.116
These obstacles may include the compensation structure, related 
employment practices, and ultimately the ideology prevalent in financial 
firms. For its participants, Wall Street has become a place of short-term 
rewards and compensation for short-term results, such as bonuses based 
upon fees for completing transactions and for the performance of a trading 
desk.
 
Certainly, it is important for both regulated and unregulated financial 
firms to enhance their risk management. Yet the fundamental problem may 
not be with the risk models themselves, or the risk managers. Even though 
financial professionals can make mistakes, use flawed assumptions, or lack 
the best organizational structure for raising risk concerns, all of which need 
to be addressed and improved, the real problem may be that there are 
serious obstacles to installing or following proper risk management in a 
financial firm. 
117 Private financial firms are no different, although private equity 
firms may have a longer-term horizon, given how the firms structure their 
management and performance fees.118
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fees for assets under management and performance fees. See ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE 
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 It is not an exaggeration to say that 
financial professionals have a basic goal of obtaining as much 
compensation as possible and then, if necessary, moving on, even if it 
means switching from firm to firm and from regulated to unregulated firm, 
and back again. Moreover, financial firms have reinforced this conduct 
because they use an extreme version of the standard short-term cost/benefit 
approach in dealing with their employees: “either produce or get out.” Even 
the financial regulators that issued the report on risk management, discussed 
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above, observed that the current financial crisis was partly due to the short-
term compensation structure common at Wall Street firms and to its 
resulting focus upon making deals and acquiring market share regardless of 
the risks involved.119
In these circumstances, with these compensation and structural 
pressures, risk managers have difficulties in finding ways reasonably to 
decrease risk, even if they use adequate risk models. Risk managers can use 
their models to emphasize that catastrophic risks are greater than what 
people believe (the “fat tail” of risk). However, bankers and traders, 
concerned about their bonuses, and management, concerned about firm 
profitability and share price, will argue that the model exaggerates the risks 
and that someone emphasizing the fat tail is being unduly pessimistic at the 
expense of business.
 
120 Financial professionals also suffer from the typical 
human focus upon the present and tendency to use an overly optimistic 
discount rate when evaluating bad future outcomes.121
More importantly, if there is no crisis present or on the horizon, risk 
managers have little to appeal to when dealing with bankers, traders, and 
executives in financial firms. They cannot appeal to the long-term stability 
of the firm because few executives and employees will have a sufficiently 
long-term horizon and senior executives are also unlikely to worry, given 
the rich benefits accorded to them. Appealing to the long-term financial 
stability of the economy and the country will also fail, because it will 
conflict with the concept of pursuit of individual wealth that is thought to 
insulate individuals from any macroeconomic disaster. In any event, such 
concerns are too abstract to be taken into consideration in the dominant 
cost/benefit calculus. Furthermore, there is nothing to ensure that the risk 
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 121. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE 6–7 (2007). 
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managers will themselves be properly trained and motivated to raise long-
term concerns. 
The standard compensation response, which would be to link 
compensation in financial services to long-term performance of transactions 
and investments by the individual banker or trader,122
Reform that would properly train risk management professionals and 
allow them to function properly within financial firms would have to be 
fundamental, altering the way firms conduct business and financial 
professionals think and conduct themselves, and therefore, it would be a 
long-term project. A proper discussion of it is beyond the scope of this 
essay.
 is unlikely to work. It 
is not clear how deferred compensation would be structured in many 
situations, such as prime brokerage, and what length of time would qualify 
as “long term.” Moreover, it is doubtful that the compensation of many 
financial professionals can be tied to the long-term performance of the firm 
when firms want the flexibility to end employment relationships without 
paying prohibitively for the privilege. In addition, aligning the interests of 
agents and the firm does not adequately address the macroeconomic harms 
from financial activities, such as systemic risk, since they do not likely even 
figure in the financial firm’s calculus in the first place. 
123 Suffice it to say, finance professionals are familiar with the 
standard economic model of the self-interested economic actor, in which 
individuals are presumed to act on their own behalf in the pursuit of 
wealth.124 The model is an overwhelming characteristic of the financial 
industry because finance professionals shape their views and conduct upon 
it (and assume that others do the same), and the result is that alternative 
perspectives are otherwise crowded out.125
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF ACTIVE REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT 
 These other perspectives are 
clearly subordinate even if they would actually help counter the self-interest 
focus that leads to the kind of destructive consequences that we see now in 
the subprime mortgage crisis. Naturally, changing the basic ideology of 
finance professionals will not occur overnight. 
In the short term, therefore, it is necessary for both regulated and 
unregulated private financial firms to enhance their risk management. Due 
to the shock that these firms have experienced from the current financial 
crisis, they are already actively engaged in this task, and there will be little 
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objection to a regulatory mandate on this subject. Yet improvements in risk 
management should not be left to the firms, with financial regulators 
playing the role of a sideline observer. 
This does not mean that regulators need be responsible for designing 
risk management models, for this has been outside their expertise for some 
time. However, they can be more insistent that regulated firms establish 
firm-wide risk management committees and that the committees have real 
power in the firm, including with respect to any transactions with the 
private financial firms.126 After all, the regulators have examination and 
visitorial powers,127
The underlying point of this essay’s review of risk management, 
occasioned by an examination of the private financial firms and their 
relationships with (including absorption by) regulated financial firms, is 
simple. It is dangerous for financial regulation and thus for the financial 
sector to be overly confident in the benefits of the market model, of which 
 which means that they can check on the day-to-day 
functioning of the committees and the risk management process. Indeed, the 
largest firms are in constant communication with regulators, and risk 
management should be an important part of this regular dialogue. 
Monitoring the risk management process will be most important when 
the current crisis ends and optimism returns to the financial markets, for 
that will be the time when firms are most ready to downplay risks. 
Moreover, examiners and senior regulators must be more skeptical of the 
risk models that the institutions use. One need not be an expert on risks to 
question the assumptions of a risk model and to criticize an institution’s 
overly optimistic view of the risks facing it. 
Financial regulators should be up to the task, despite ongoing 
skepticism about the motivation of personnel, who generally come from the 
private sector and expect eventually to return to it. As much as financial 
regulators will be sympathetic to the industry that they regulate, their 
mission is to be concerned about and to promote the long-term health of the 
financial industry and thus of the U.S. economy—a focus now absent from 
financial firms—not the short-term profitability of a particular financial 
institution. With this mission, which the best financial firms must surely 
acknowledge, regulators can insist that the firms take into account the risks 
facing them. In turn, they can insist that firms select appropriate discount 
rates for the pricing of these risks, as opposed to the unduly optimistic ones 
that are often used in financial institutions during boom periods. In sum, 
regulators have to counter the tendency of financial institutions to focus on 
the short term and try themselves not to be swept up into the enthusiasm 
over asset pricing bubbles. 
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the private financial firm is a paradigm, and to be equally overly dismissive 
of regulation. If anything, risk management involving private financial 
firms, whether outside or inside regulated financial firms, has been a case 
study in this danger, rather than an example of the obvious supremacy of 
the market model. This review suggests that, for the stability of the 
financial system, it is time to reestablish the balance between financial 
markets and regulation on strong enough grounds so that they endure when 
the good times in finance return. 
